In Hyde v. Ruble, the United States Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a contract between two parties was valid and enforceable. The contract in question was between a husband and wife, and it provided that the husband would pay the wife a certain sum of money each month for the rest of her life. The husband had failed to make the payments, and the wife sued him for breach of contract. The Supreme Court held that the contract was valid and enforceable. The Court noted that the contract was not against public policy, and that the parties had the capacity to enter into a contract. The Court also noted that the contract was not unconscionable, and that the husband had the ability to pay the wife the money he had promised. The Court concluded that the contract was valid and enforceable, and that the husband was liable for breach of contract. The Court ordered the husband to pay the wife the money he had promised.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Hyde v. Ruble, arguing that the majority had misinterpreted a key provision of the 1872 Mining Act and thus reached an incorrect conclusion. He argued that Section 23 of the act did not provide for a forfeiture of all rights to unpatented mining claims if any portion was sold or transferred without authorization from Congress; rather, it only required such forfeitures when "all" portions were so disposed of. In this case, he noted that while some parts had been sold off by one party without permission from Congress, other parts remained under their control and therefore no forfeiture should have occurred. Furthermore, Justice Field argued that even if there had been a violation of Section 23's provisions regarding unauthorized sales or transfers as alleged by the plaintiff-appellant (Hyde), then they would still be entitled to compensation since they held valid title at one point prior to any sale taking place - something which could not be said for those who purchased land after such violations took place. Finally, he concluded his dissent with an admonishment against allowing courts to interpret statutes too broadly in order to reach desired outcomes: "It is dangerous," he wrote,"to extend beyond its plain meaning [a] statute."