The U.S. Supreme Court case Interstate Commerce Commission v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., et al., in 1932 involved the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and several railroad companies. The ICC had ordered the railroads to cease certain discriminatory practices related to freight rates that were deemed unfair to shippers in Boston compared with those in other cities like New York or Philadelphia. The railroads challenged this order, arguing it was beyond the ICC's authority as it required them not only to stop a practice but also implement new rate structures which they claimed would cause financial harm. However, the Supreme Court upheld the ICC's order stating that its power extended beyond merely preventing discrimination; it could also require affirmative action from carriers if necessary for public interest and fairness among shippers across different regions.

In the dissenting opinion for Interstate Commerce Commission v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., Justice Stone argued that the court majority had overstepped its bounds by substituting their judgment for that of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). He believed that it was not within the purview of courts to decide whether a rate is just and reasonable; rather, this decision should be left to regulatory bodies like ICC who have expertise in such matters. Furthermore, he contended that there was substantial evidence supporting ICC's conclusion about rates being too high and thus unjustifiable. Therefore, according to him, these conclusions should not have been overturned by judicial review unless they were found unreasonable or unsupported by evidence. In essence, Justice Stone emphasized deference towards administrative agencies' decisions on technical issues within their jurisdiction.