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In the case of Illinois Brick Co. et al. v. Illinois et al., the U.S Supreme Court ruled that indirect purchasers who have not directly purchased goods or services from a company accused of antitrust violations do not have standing to sue for damages under federal law, specifically Section 4 of the Clayton Act. The State of Illinois had brought an action against concrete block manufacturers alleging price fixing and sought damages as an indirect purchaser because it contracted with general contractors who bought blocks from these manufacturers. However, in a 5-4 decision, the court held that allowing such suits would risk complex litigation over apportionment of damages and potentially result in multiple liability for defendants.
In the dissenting opinion for Illinois Brick Co. et al. v. Illinois et al., Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, argued that indirect purchasers should be allowed to sue for antitrust damages under federal law even if they did not directly purchase from the alleged violator of antitrust laws. The dissenters believed that denying such right would undermine the deterrent effect of treble damage actions and allow monopolistic practices to go unchecked due to difficulties in tracing overcharges through distribution chains or proving direct injury as a result of price fixing conspiracies. They also pointed out potential administrative complexities arising from allowing only direct purchasers to sue while excluding others who may have suffered more severe economic harm but were further down the chain of distribution.