In the case of Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Crail, doing business as P. McCoy Fuel Company in 1929, the Supreme Court ruled on a dispute over freight charges for coal shipments. The railroad company had charged rates based on an interpretation of its tariff that was later found to be incorrect by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The fuel company sued to recover what it believed were excessive payments made under protest and won at both district court and appellate levels. However, the Supreme Court reversed these decisions stating that even though ICC's decision was retroactive in nature, it did not entitle shippers like Crail to refunds for past overpayments unless there is explicit provision in applicable law or regulation allowing such refund claims due to changes in rate interpretations by regulatory authorities.

In the dissenting opinion for Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Crail, it was argued that the court erred in its interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act and its amendments. The dissenting justices believed that there should be a distinction between 'rate' and 'practice.' They contended that while rates are subject to review by courts, practices should not be unless they directly affect rates or discriminate against shippers. In this case, they felt that Illinois Central's practice of requiring prepayment did not fall under either category as it applied equally to all shippers without affecting their freight charges. Therefore, according to them, this issue was outside judicial purview and within the railroad company’s discretion as part of its business operations.