In the 1993 case In re Grant Anderson, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a bankruptcy court had erred in discharging an attorney's debt for legal malpractice damages. The petitioner argued that such debts should not be dischargeable under Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code because they resulted from "willful and malicious injury" caused by the debtor. However, after reviewing previous cases and considering legislative intent behind this section of code, the Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation. They held that only debts arising from intentional torts or similar conduct intended to cause harm could fall within this exception to dischargeability. Therefore, since legal malpractice is typically considered a form of negligence rather than an intentional act meant to harm clients, these types of debts can generally be discharged in bankruptcy.

The dissenting opinion in the case of In re Grant Anderson, 1993 argued that the majority's decision to deny habeas corpus relief was incorrect. The dissent believed that there were significant issues with how evidence had been handled and presented during Anderson's trial, which could have potentially influenced its outcome. They also took issue with the fact that certain pieces of exculpatory evidence - specifically those related to another potential suspect - were not disclosed to the defense team prior to trial. This lack of disclosure, they argued, violated Brady v. Maryland (1963), a landmark Supreme Court ruling requiring prosecutors to disclose materially exculpatory evidence in their possession to defendants before trials begin. Furthermore, they disagreed with how lower courts interpreted Strickland v Washington (1984) regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claims by setting an unreasonably high bar for proving prejudice resulting from attorney errors or omissions during trial preparation and presentation phases.