In re Wight is a Supreme Court case from 1877 that dealt with the issue of whether a state court could issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The petitioner, Wight, was a prisoner in the federal penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas. He had been convicted of a federal crime and was serving a sentence of five years. Wight petitioned the state court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was being unlawfully detained. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to detain prisoners. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the federal government had the power to protect that right. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to detain prisoners. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the federal government had the power to protect that right.

In the dissenting opinion of In re Wight, Petitioner, Justice Harlan argued that the majority's decision was based on a misinterpretation of the law. He asserted that Congress had not intended to limit habeas corpus petitions to those cases in which there is an allegation of physical restraint or confinement. Rather, he argued that Congress intended for habeas corpus petitions to be available in any case where a person has been deprived of their liberty without due process. Furthermore, Justice Harlan noted that even if one were to accept the majority's interpretation of Congressional intent regarding habeas corpus petitions, it would still be inappropriate for them to deny Wight's petition because his alleged deprivation did not involve physical restraint or confinement but rather involved being denied access and use of public lands by state officials. Thus, according Justice Harlan’s dissent it was wrong for the court deny Wight’s petition as they did and instead should have granted him relief from this unjust deprivation under federal law through a writ issued by way of habeas corpus proceedings