The U.S. Supreme Court case Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., et al. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Department of Labor, et al., 1996 revolved around the interpretation and application of a provision in the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). The court had to decide whether an employer could be held liable for additional compensation under Section 8(f) of LHWCA if it failed to apply for relief within thirty days after receiving an award notice from the deputy commissioner as required by Section 22(a). In this case, Ingalls Shipbuilding was ordered to pay disability benefits to four employees but did not seek relief until several years later when their conditions worsened. The Supreme Court ruled against Ingalls Shipbuilding stating that employers must strictly adhere to the time limit set out in Section 22(a) or risk being fully liable for any increased compensation awards.

In the dissenting opinion for Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Department of Labor et al., Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Section 33(g) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). He argued that this section should not bar a worker from receiving additional compensation if they had already accepted a settlement from a third party without obtaining their employer's approval. According to him, such an interpretation was inconsistent with both the text and purpose of LHWCA which aimed at protecting workers’ rights rather than limiting them based on technicalities. Furthermore, he pointed out that there were other sections in LHWCA specifically designed to prevent double recovery by employees which made it unnecessary to interpret Section 33(g) in such restrictive manner.