In the case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Bagamasbad, 1976, the United States Supreme Court was asked to determine whether an alien who had been granted voluntary departure but remained in the country past their allotted time could apply for suspension of deportation. The respondent, a Filipino citizen named Lina Bagamasbad, overstayed her visa and was ordered to voluntarily depart from the U.S., however she failed to do so within the given timeframe. She then applied for suspension of deportation under Section 244(a)(1) of Immigration and Nationality Act which allows such relief if an alien has been physically present in U.S. for seven years or more. The INS denied her application on grounds that period after expiration of voluntary departure cannot be counted towards physical presence requirement as it is not "lawful" stay according to them; this decision was upheld by Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). However, upon judicial review both District Court & Court Of Appeals ruled against INS's interpretation stating that law does not specify "lawful" presence hence all periods including those beyond permitted stay can be considered. The Supreme court affirmed these decisions holding that nothing in language or legislative history indicates Congress intended only lawful unrelinquished domicile should count towards seven-year requirement thus allowing Ms.Bagamasbad's request.

In the dissenting opinion for Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Bagamasbad, Justice William Rehnquist argued that the majority's decision to allow an alien to reopen deportation proceedings based on a change in personal circumstances was not supported by any statutory or regulatory authority. He contended that allowing such changes would lead to endless delays in deportation proceedings as aliens could continually request reopening of their cases whenever they experienced a change in circumstances. Furthermore, he pointed out that Congress had provided specific relief mechanisms for aliens facing hardship due to deportation, and it was not within the Court's purview to create additional ones. In his view, this ruling undermined both Congressional intent and administrative efficiency.