In the 1986 case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Hector, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in favor of the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service). The respondent, a citizen of Philippines who had been living unlawfully in America since his visa expired, was ordered to be deported by an immigration judge. However, he appealed this decision on grounds that he qualified for suspension under Section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as he had continuously resided in America for seven years prior to deportation proceedings commencing. The Board of Immigration Appeals rejected his appeal stating that any period spent unlawfully should not count towards continuous residence requirement. This ruling was reversed by Ninth Circuit court which held that unlawful presence could still count towards 'continuous physical presence'. But when taken up with Supreme Court it sided with INS's interpretation concluding that Congress intended 'lawful unrelinquished domicile' rather than mere physical presence while drafting Section 244(a)(1), thus making Hector ineligible for suspension.

In the dissenting opinion for Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Hector, it was argued that the majority's interpretation of Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act was incorrect. The dissenters believed that this section should not be applied to deportation proceedings initiated because of criminal convictions acquired after entry into the United States. They contended that such an application would create a disparity between aliens who were excludable at entry due to their criminal records and those who became deportable only after committing crimes in America, which they saw as unfair. Furthermore, they disagreed with extending discretionary relief from deportation to individuals convicted of serious crimes like drug trafficking or murder without clear legislative intent supporting such extension.