The U.S. Supreme Court case Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Pangilinan et al., 1987, revolved around the issue of whether courts had authority to grant citizenship to individuals who failed to comply with statutory requirements for naturalization. The respondents were Filipino nationals who served in the United States Armed Forces during World War II but did not apply for naturalization before deadlines set by Congress expired. They sought a court order granting them citizenship based on their military service, arguing that they were unable to meet the deadline due to bureaucratic obstacles and misinformation from government officials. However, the Supreme Court ruled against them in a 6-3 decision stating that only Congress has power over immigration policy and therefore courts do not have authority to confer citizenship on an individual outside parameters established by federal law. The majority opinion held that while it was unfortunate these veterans missed out on obtaining U.S. Citizenship due circumstances beyond their control, it would be inappropriate judicial overreach for courts intervene where legislative action is required.

The dissenting opinion in the case of IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. PANGILINAN et al., 1987, was penned by Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and O'Connor. The dissent argued that the majority's decision to deny naturalization to Filipino war veterans who had not complied with statutory requirements was incorrect because it failed to consider Congress' intent when passing relevant laws. They believed that Congress intended for these veterans to be able to become citizens despite procedural irregularities or noncompliance with certain rules due their unique circumstances as wartime allies of the U.S.. Furthermore, they disagreed with the majority's view on judicial power over naturalization proceedings; while acknowledging courts cannot confer citizenship without statutory authorization, they contended that courts do have authority under existing statutes to correct administrative errors or oversights in such cases. Therefore, according them, denying citizenship based solely on technical grounds contradicted legislative intent and unduly limited judicial discretion.