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In the case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Phinpathya, 1983, the U.S Supreme Court ruled that a brief departure from the United States does not interrupt an immigrant's continuous physical presence required for suspension of deportation under immigration law. The respondent, Mrs. Phinpathya, was a Thai national who had overstayed her visa in America by several years but briefly returned to Thailand during this period before coming back to the US illegally again. She later applied for suspension of deportation based on seven years' continuous residence in America as per Section 244(a)(1) of Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). However, INS argued that her short trip outside US broke this continuity which led to litigation up till Supreme Court. The court held that Congress intended "continuous" to mean uninterrupted physical presence without any exception for brief departures when it enacted INA section 244(a)(1). Therefore Mrs.Phinpathya’s absence from USA even if it was brief interrupted her 'continuous' stay thus making her ineligible for relief under INA section 244(a)(1). This ruling clarified how 'continuous' is interpreted within context of immigration laws.
In the dissenting opinion for Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Phinpathya, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority's interpretation of immigration law was too narrow and failed to consider its humanitarian purpose. He contended that the statute should be interpreted more broadly to allow for exceptions in cases where an immigrant has been absent from the U.S. for a brief period but maintained strong ties with their American family or community during this time. In his view, such individuals have not truly "departed" in any meaningful sense and should not be penalized by being barred from discretionary relief under Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Furthermore, he criticized the majority's reliance on legislative history as inconsistent with previous court decisions which prioritized statutory language over congressional intent.