In the 1968 case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stanisic, the United States Supreme Court dealt with issues related to immigration law and deportation proceedings. The respondent, a Yugoslavian national who had entered the U.S on a nonimmigrant visa, was ordered to be deported after overstaying his visa period. He appealed this decision arguing that he should have been granted discretionary relief from deportation under Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act because he feared persecution in Yugoslavia due to his political beliefs. However, both lower courts denied him this relief stating that fear of economic disadvantage did not qualify as "persecution". The Supreme Court reversed these decisions ruling that an alien's fear of being subjected to economic detriment upon returning home could constitute "persecution" under Section 243(h). Therefore, it remanded the case back for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

The dissenting opinion in the case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stanisic argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with previous rulings on similar issues, particularly regarding the interpretation of "entry" under immigration law. The dissent emphasized that an alien who has been paroled into the United States for prosecution should not be considered as having made a legal entry into the country, even if they were subsequently convicted and served time in prison. They contended that such individuals remain technically outside U.S borders from an immigration standpoint until their parole ends or is revoked by authorities. Therefore, according to this view, Stanisic should have been treated as seeking admission to America rather than being already within its boundaries when his parole ended upon completion of his prison term - making him subject to deportation based on existing laws at that time against admitting ex-convicts.