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In the 1983 case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an immigrant facing deportation does not have to prove a "clear probability" of persecution in their home country to avoid being deported; instead, they must demonstrate a "well-founded fear" of persecution. The case involved Stevan M. Stevic, a Yugoslavian national who had been living illegally in the United States since 1976 and was ordered by INS for deportation after his visa expired. He sought suspension of deportation claiming he would face political persecution if returned to Yugoslavia due to his anti-communist beliefs and activities while residing in America which were known by Yugoslav authorities through news articles published about him there. The court held that under section 243(h) of Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), it is required only 'a reasonable likelihood' or 'good reason' standard rather than clear probability standard for proving threat perception upon return as argued by government's counsel. This ruling set precedent on how asylum claims are evaluated within U.S., shifting from requiring proof towards demonstrating well-founded fear making it easier for refugees seeking asylum based on potential threats back home.
In the dissenting opinion for Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Stevic, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority's interpretation of the Refugee Act was too narrow. He believed that Congress intended to provide asylum not only to those who could prove a "clear probability" of persecution but also to those who had a "well-founded fear," which he interpreted as requiring less certainty about potential harm. The justice contended that this broader standard better reflected international refugee law and U.S.'s humanitarian commitments. Furthermore, he criticized the majority for relying on legislative history instead of clear statutory language in interpreting the act, arguing it led them to an incorrect conclusion about congressional intent.