In Insurance Company v. Harris, the United States Supreme Court was asked to decide whether an insurance company was liable for damages caused by a fire that occurred on the insured's property. The insured had purchased a policy from the insurance company that provided coverage for losses caused by fire. The insured argued that the insurance company was liable for the damages caused by the fire, while the insurance company argued that the policy did not cover the damages. The Supreme Court held that the insurance company was liable for the damages caused by the fire. The Court reasoned that the policy provided coverage for losses caused by fire, and that the insured had paid the premiums for the policy. Therefore, the Court concluded that the insurance company was liable for the damages caused by the fire. The Court also held that the insurance company was not liable for any consequential damages caused by the fire. The Court reasoned that the policy did not provide coverage for consequential damages, and that the insured had not paid any additional premiums for such coverage. Therefore, the Court concluded that the insurance company was not liable for any consequential damages caused by the fire.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Insurance Company v. Harris, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to an unjust result. He argued that under prior decisions of this Court, a contract may be so framed as to make it valid for one purpose but invalid for another; thus, if a policy of insurance is issued with conditions which are void because they conflict with public policy or statutory law, those conditions will not affect other parts of the contract which are valid and enforceable. In this case, he argued that although certain provisions were unenforceable due to their violation of public policy or statute law - such as requiring payment by installments - these should not have been held fatal to all other portions of the agreement between parties. Justice Field concluded his dissent by noting that while courts must always adhere strictly to rules governing contracts made in violation of public laws or policies, here there had been no clear showing either way on whether any part violated such laws; therefore he believed it was improper for the court below (and now also improper for this Court)to hold all parts equally void without further inquiry into each individual provision's validity.