This case involved a dispute between an insurance company and a railroad company. The insurance company had issued a policy to the railroad company, which provided coverage for any losses incurred due to the negligence of the railroad company. The railroad company was sued by a third party for damages resulting from a train accident, and the insurance company refused to pay the claim. The railroad company then sued the insurance company for breach of contract. The Supreme Court held that the insurance company was liable for the damages. The Court found that the insurance policy was valid and that the railroad company had a right to expect that the insurance company would fulfill its obligations under the policy. The Court also held that the insurance company was liable for the damages even though the railroad company had been negligent in causing the accident. The Court reasoned that the insurance company had agreed to provide coverage for any losses incurred due to the negligence of the railroad company, and that the insurance company was therefore obligated to pay the claim.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Insurance Company v. Railroad Company, arguing that the majority's decision was wrong and should be reversed. He argued that a contract between two parties must be interpreted according to its plain language, and not by any extraneous considerations or implications. In this case, he believed that the contract clearly stated that if either party failed to perform their obligations under it then they would become liable for damages caused as a result of such non-performance. The majority had instead held that since one of the parties had already been found liable for breach of another part of the contract, they could not also be held liable for damages resulting from failure to perform on this particular clause - an interpretation which Justice Field felt was incorrect given what he saw as clear wording in the agreement itself. He concluded his dissent by noting his disagreement with both how broadly applicable precedent had been applied here and with how narrowly specific language within this particular agreement had been interpreted by his colleagues on the bench.