The U.S. Supreme Court case Interstate Commerce Commission v. Detroit, Grand Haven and Milwaukee Railway Company in 1896 revolved around the issue of whether the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had the authority to mandate a railway company to keep its rates at a certain level. The ICC argued that it was within their power under federal law to regulate interstate commerce, which included setting fair and reasonable rates for railroads crossing state lines. On the other hand, Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Railway Co contended that such an order violated their rights as they were not given due process before being subjected to these regulations. In its decision, however, the Supreme Court sided with the railway company stating that while Congress did have broad powers over interstate commerce through legislation like creating ICC itself; it could not delegate those legislative powers onto an administrative body like ICC without providing proper procedural safeguards including notice and hearing requirements for affected parties i.e., railroad companies here. Thus this landmark ruling limited regulatory reach of agencies like ICC by emphasizing on need for due process protections even when public interest is involved in regulation of private businesses operating across states.

The dissenting opinion in the case of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Detroit, Grand Haven and Milwaukee Railway Company argued that the Interstate Commerce Act did not grant the commission authority to establish through routes or joint rates for railroads. The justices believed that this power was reserved for Congress alone and could only be delegated by explicit legislative action. They also contended that even if such a delegation were made, it would still violate constitutional principles because it would amount to an unlawful delegation of legislative power to an administrative body. Furthermore, they disagreed with the majority's interpretation of "just and reasonable" rates as being synonymous with "fairly remunerative" rates, arguing instead that these terms should be understood in their ordinary sense without any presumption about what constitutes a fair return on investment for railroad companies.