The U.S. Supreme Court case Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company in 1912 revolved around the issue of whether or not the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had the authority to determine and set reasonable railroad rates for transporting goods across state lines, a power that was challenged by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company. The ICC argued that it held this regulatory power under federal law, specifically through provisions of the Hepburn Act of 1906 which expanded its jurisdiction over railroads' freight rates. The railroad company contested this claim, arguing against such regulation on their business operations. In its decision, however, the Supreme Court sided with ICC affirming its right to regulate interstate commerce including setting fair and just railway transportation rates when necessary as per Hepburn Act's mandate.

In the dissenting opinion for Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, it was argued that the Supreme Court had overstepped its bounds by interfering with decisions made by administrative bodies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The ICC's role is to regulate interstate commerce, including setting fair and reasonable rates for railroad companies. In this case, they determined that a certain rate set by Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company was unreasonable. However, instead of deferring to their expertise in these matters as has been customary in previous cases involving regulatory agencies' determinations on technical issues within their purview, the majority chose to substitute its own judgment for that of ICC's experts. This departure from precedent undermines not only the authority but also effectiveness of administrative bodies like ICC whose primary function is regulation based on specialized knowledge and experience beyond courts' generalist competencies.