In the International Stevedoring Company v. Haverty case of 1926, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in favor of an injured worker who sought compensation from his employer under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). The plaintiff, Mr. Haverty, was a longshoreman employed by International Stevedoring Company when he sustained injuries while loading cargo onto a ship docked at Baltimore harbor. He filed for compensation under LHWCA which provides benefits to maritime workers injured on navigable waters of the United States or adjoining areas used for loading and unloading vessels. However, his employer argued that since they were engaged in intrastate commerce rather than interstate commerce during this incident - as required by LHWCA - they should not be liable for compensation. The court disagreed with this argument stating that although specific operations may have been local or confined to one state, stevedoring is inherently part of maritime industry which is involved in interstate and foreign commerce; hence it falls within Congress's jurisdiction over such matters through Commerce Clause of Constitution. Therefore, it upheld lower courts' decisions awarding Haverty damages based on provisions set forth by LHWCA.

In the dissenting opinion for International Stevedoring Company v. Haverty, Justice Stone disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act (Jones Act). He argued that it was not Congress' intent to allow a seaman to recover damages from his employer under both state law and federal maritime law for injuries sustained on navigable waters. Instead, he believed that Congress intended to provide a uniform national remedy for such injuries by extending federal maritime jurisdiction over them. Thus, according to Justice Stone, allowing recovery under both laws would disrupt this uniformity and potentially lead to double recovery or other inconsistencies in enforcement. Furthermore, he contended that there was no clear indication in either the text or legislative history of Section 33 suggesting an intention by Congress to permit dual remedies.