The U.S. Supreme Court case J. Homer Fritch, Incorporated, et al. v. United States in 1918 revolved around the issue of whether a contract for the sale and delivery of goods could be considered completed when only part of the goods were delivered due to unforeseen circumstances such as war or government intervention preventing full completion of the contract's terms. The plaintiff, J.Homer Fritch Inc., had entered into a contract with Russian buyers for steel billets but was unable to deliver all items because Russia withdrew from World War I and closed its ports before complete shipment could occur; thus leading them to sue their insurer (the US Government) for losses incurred on undelivered goods under war risk insurance policies issued by it during WWI. In this case, the court ruled against J.Homer Fritch Inc., stating that since they did not make every reasonable effort within their power to fulfill their contractual obligations - including rerouting shipments through other open ports - they were not entitled to recover damages under these policies.

In the dissenting opinion for J. Homer Fritch, Incorporated v. United States, it was argued that the majority's decision to uphold a federal law prohibiting interstate transportation of goods produced by child labor was an overreach of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. The dissenting justices believed that this interpretation expanded Congress' regulatory authority too far into areas traditionally governed by state law - specifically, labor standards and conditions. They contended that while Congress has broad powers to regulate commerce between states, it does not have unlimited discretion to dictate how goods involved in such commerce are produced or manufactured within individual states. This view held that if every product could be regulated based on its method of production, then there would essentially be no limit to federal power over local matters which should remain under state jurisdiction.