In the case of Jackson, Ex Dem. St. John v. Chew, a dispute arose between two parties over an unpaid debt and whether or not it was secured by a mortgage on real estate owned by one of the parties (Chew). The Supreme Court held that in order for Chew to be liable for payment of the debt he had to have been aware at the time he entered into his agreement with St. John that there was already an existing lien on his property securing another debt owed to someone else (Jackson). Since this knowledge could not be proven, Chew was found not liable for repayment and Jackson's claim against him failed as well since without proof that Chew knew about his prior obligation when entering into his contract with St. John, no legal grounds existed upon which Jackson could enforce collection from him either directly or indirectly through foreclosure proceedings against said property.

In Jackson, Ex Dem. St. John v Chew, Chief Justice Marshall delivered the dissenting opinion of the court. He argued that a state could not pass a law which would impair an obligation created by another state's laws and that this was exactly what had happened in this case. The plaintiff held title to land under Virginia law but Maryland passed a statute which allowed for escheat of the property if it remained unclaimed for seven years; however, Virginia did not have such a provision in its own laws at the time when title vested with St John so Marshall argued that Maryland's statute should be declared unconstitutional as it impaired an obligation created by another state’s laws and thus violated Article IV Section 1 of the Constitution (the Full Faith and Credit Clause). Furthermore, he noted that even though states may have similar statutes regarding escheats they are still separate sovereigns who cannot interfere with each other’s obligations or rights without violating constitutional principles.