Jackson v. Ludeling was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who had been convicted in a federal court. The case arose when a prisoner, Jackson, was convicted in a federal court and sentenced to imprisonment. Jackson then sought a writ of habeas corpus from a state court, claiming that his conviction was unconstitutional. The state court granted the writ and ordered Jackson released from prison. The United States Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with a federal court's judgment. The Court further held that the state court's action was an unconstitutional interference with the federal court's judgment and that the writ of habeas corpus should not have been issued. In conclusion, the United States Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who had been convicted in a federal court. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with a federal court's judgment. The Court further held that the state court's action was an unconstitutional interference with the federal court's judgment and that the writ of habeas corpus should not have been issued.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Jackson v. Ludeling, arguing that the majority's decision was incorrect and should be reversed. He argued that under Missouri law, a contract for personal services could not be enforced by an action of debt or assumpsit because it lacked consideration; therefore, he concluded that there was no legal basis to support plaintiff's claim against defendant. Furthermore, Justice Field noted that even if there had been consideration present in this case, it would have been insufficient to sustain a cause of action as the promise made by defendant did not constitute sufficient benefit to plaintiff and thus failed to meet the requirements of mutuality necessary for enforceability. In conclusion, Justice Field believed that since neither party provided any valuable consideration which could serve as grounds for recovery on either side - nor did they enter into any binding agreement - then judgment should have gone in favor of defendant rather than plaintiff.