Jacob U. Payne, J. P. Harrison and George W. Huntingdon were commercial partners operating under the name of Payne & Harrison who intervened as plaintiffs in error against Jonathan J. Niles, James M. Niles, Leander H Corey and Stephen Allen who were all partners in a business venture together at the time of this case being heard by the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS). The dispute between these parties was over an agreement that had been made to purchase certain real estate property for $20,000 with payment due within two years from date of contract signing but no deed would be given until full payment was received by seller; however it is alleged that buyer failed to make payments on time or pay off balance owed so seller refused to give deed even after partial payments had been made towards total amount due which led SCOTUS ruling in favor of plaintiff’s claim that they should have received title upon making said partial payments since there was no stipulation stated otherwise when original contract was signed between both parties involved thus allowing them legal right to take possession without having paid entire sum agreed upon initially per terms set forth originally prior to any litigation taking place regarding matter at hand here today before court now adjourned

In the dissenting opinion of Payne & Harrison v. Jonathan J. Niles, James M. Niles, Leander H. Corey and Stephen Allen, Justice Grier argued that the court should not have granted a new trial to the defendants because there was no evidence presented in support of their motion for a new trial on any ground other than newly discovered evidence which had been available at the time of original trial but was not used by either party due to mistake or inadvertence. He further stated that it is well established law that when parties fail to use such evidence during an original trial they cannot be allowed relief from its effects afterwards through a new trial unless fraud or surprise can be shown as having prevented them from using it earlier. Since neither party could demonstrate this in this case, he concluded that granting a new trial would set an improper precedent and thus should not have been done here.