In the case of Jago v. Van Curen, 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a delay in indictment does not violate an individual's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial if there is no actual prejudice against the defendant as a result of this delay. The respondent, Van Curen was arrested and released without being charged for two years after his arrest due to lack of evidence. Later on, he was indicted based on new evidence found by police officers during their investigation into another crime scene which linked him to the original crime he had been arrested for earlier but never charged with at that time. He argued that his constitutional rights were violated because of this delayed indictment; however, the court disagreed stating that since there was no actual harm done towards him from this delay (like anxiety or concern), it did not infringe upon his rights under the Sixth Amendment.

In the dissenting opinion for Jago v. Van Curen, Justice Brennan argued that a prisoner's expectation of parole is constitutionally protected and should not be arbitrarily denied without due process. He contended that Ohio law created an expectancy of parole which was part of the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, when this expectancy was revoked without any explanation or opportunity to respond, it violated constitutional protections against arbitrary state action. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's view that only formal revocation after a hearing could constitute deprivation; instead arguing that even informal decisions made outside official proceedings can deprive individuals of their rights if they have significant consequences on one’s life and freedom.