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02-258 JINKS v. RICHLAND COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA Ruling below: South Carolina Supreme Court, 563 S.E.2d 104. QUESTION PRESENTED The federal supplemental jurisdiction statute includes a provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), that tolls the period of limitations for supplemental claims while they are pending in federal court and for 30 days after they are dismissed. The question presented is whether the tolling provision invades state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment and the Necessary and Proper Clause. CERT. GRANTED: 10/21/02
In the 2002 case of Susan Jinks v. Richland County, South Carolina, the U.S Supreme Court ruled that a local government unit is not immune from paying attorney's fees under federal law. The case arose when Susan Jinks sued Richland County for wrongful death and negligence after her husband died in police custody. She won the lawsuit and was awarded attorney's fees under Section 1988 of Title 42 of the United States Code which allows prevailing parties to recover such costs in civil rights litigation cases. However, Richland County argued that it was exempt from this provision due to its status as an "arm of state" based on principles derived from the Eleventh Amendment immunity doctrine. The Supreme Court disagreed with this argument stating that Congress intended all defendants - including local governments - to be liable for these expenses when they enacted Section 1988. Therefore, it held that there is no inherent or automatic exemption for local governmental units like counties or municipalities from being responsible for attorney’s fees under federal law if they lose in civil rights cases.
In the dissenting opinion for Susan Jinks v. Richland County, South Carolina, Justice Scalia argued that the Court's decision to allow an extension of time under federal law in state litigation was a misinterpretation of Congressional intent and overstepped its bounds by interfering with state court procedures. He contended that Congress did not intend for 28 U.S.C §1367(d) to apply once a case had been dismissed by a federal court and returned to state jurisdiction. Instead, he believed it should only apply while cases were still within federal jurisdiction or if they were later removed back into it. By applying this statute after dismissal from federal courts, Scalia felt the majority undermined states' rights to control their own statutes of limitations and procedural rules without clear congressional mandate - something he saw as violating principles of comity between different judicial systems.