John Conard, Marshal of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, brought a case against Francis H. Nicoll in 1830. The dispute arose when Conard attempted to execute a writ issued by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on behalf of William Burd and others who were creditors to Nicoll’s estate. In response, Nicoll argued that he was protected from execution under an Act passed by Congress which provided for insolvent debtors relief from their debts if they had resided in any state or territory within the United States for at least two years prior to filing bankruptcy proceedings. The US Supreme Court ultimately ruled that this act did not apply as it only applied to those residing outside the jurisdiction where suit was brought and since Nicoll had been living in Pennsylvania during his bankruptcy proceedings, he could not be shielded from execution under this law. This decision established important precedent regarding federal laws governing bankruptcies and debt collection procedures across different states and territories within America's borders.

In the case of John Conard, Marshal of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania vs. Francis H. Nicoll, the dissenting opinion was that a writ issued by a state court should be respected and enforced in federal courts as long as it does not conflict with any laws or regulations established by Congress. The majority opinion held that such writs could only be enforced if they were authorized under an act of Congress or some other law passed by Congress; however, Justice Story argued that this interpretation would lead to states being deprived from exercising their own authority over matters within their jurisdiction and thus violate principles set forth in Article IV Section 1 of the Constitution which guarantees each state "a republican form government." He further noted that although there may have been cases where acts passed by individual states had been declared unconstitutional due to conflicting with federal laws, those instances did not apply here since no such conflicts existed between this particular writ and any existing federal legislation. Therefore he concluded that respecting and enforcing this particular writ was consistent with both constitutional principles as well as common sense legal practice.