The case of John Robertson v. United States ex rel. Wykenna Watson (2009) revolved around the issue of whether a criminal defendant, who had his conviction set aside in post-conviction proceedings, could be subjected to retrial without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. The clause protects against multiple prosecutions for the same offense after acquittal or conviction and against multiple punishments for the same offense. In this case, Robertson was initially convicted on charges related to domestic violence but later had his convictions overturned due to ineffective assistance from his counsel during trial. However, when prosecutors sought a new trial based on these vacated convictions, Robertson argued that it would constitute double jeopardy as he already served time for those crimes before they were overturned. The Supreme Court disagreed with him and ruled that because his original convictions were not reversed due to insufficiency of evidence but rather procedural errors (ineffective legal representation), retrying him did not violate double jeopardy protections.

In the dissenting opinion for the case of John Robertson v. United States ex rel. Wykenna Watson, Justice Scalia argued that a court-ordered protection order does not constitute a "consent decree" and therefore cannot be enforced through contempt proceedings under federal law. He contended that such orders are typically unilateral, not requiring consent from both parties as is characteristic of true consent decrees. Furthermore, he pointed out that these orders do not resolve disputes between parties but rather provide temporary relief while litigation continues - another feature distinguishing them from traditional consent decrees which aim to settle legal disagreements definitively. Therefore, in his view, treating this type of order as if it were a consent decree expands federal jurisdiction beyond its proper bounds and infringes upon state authority over domestic relations matters.