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03-636 JOHNSON V. CALIFORNIA DECISION BELOW: 321 F3d 791 CERT. GRANTED 3/1/2004 QUESTION PRESENTED: 1. Is a state's practice of routine racial segregation of state prisoners for at least a 60- day period subject to the same strict scrutiny generally applicable to all other challenges to intentional racial segregation, or is it excused from such scrutiny and subject only to the more relaxed review afforded under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)? 2. Does California's practice of routine racial segregation of state prisoners for at least a 60-day period violate the Equal Protection Clause? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 01-56436
In Garrison S. Johnson v. California et al., 2004, the U.S Supreme Court examined whether a policy of racial segregation in Californian prisons violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The policy was implemented by prison officials who segregated prisoners by race for up to 60 days when they entered a new correctional facility or after being transferred from another one, with an aim to prevent racial violence within these facilities. Johnson, an African-American inmate, argued that this practice was discriminatory and unconstitutional. However, California defended its policy as necessary for maintaining safety and order within their prisons. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Johnson stating that strict scrutiny should be applied to all instances where state action is based on racial classifications - even those made for security reasons inside prisons - thereby requiring states to demonstrate compelling interests justifying such actions and proving them narrowly tailored towards achieving said interests.
In the dissenting opinion for Garrison S. Johnson v. California, Justice Stevens argued that racial segregation in prisons should be subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of its duration or purpose. He disagreed with the majority's decision to remand and instead believed that a ruling should have been made on whether California’s policy was constitutional or not. Justice Stevens contended that any form of state-sponsored racial discrimination is inherently suspect and must meet an extremely high burden of justification, which he did not believe had been met by California’s prison system in this case.