In the 1973 case of Johnson, Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, et al. v. Robison, the U.S Supreme Court ruled that conscientious objectors who performed civilian service in lieu of military duty were not entitled to educational benefits under the GI Bill. The plaintiff, a conscientious objector named Robison, argued that his exclusion from these benefits violated his Fifth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection under law as well as his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. However, the court held that Congress had rational basis for limiting these benefits only to veterans who served in active duty since they faced greater risks and sacrifices than those performing alternative services at home.

In the dissenting opinion for Johnson, Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, et al. v. Robison (1973), Justice Rehnquist argued that the court majority erred in its interpretation of Section 211(a) and overstepped its judicial authority by delving into legislative territory. He contended that Congress intended to bar all types of review under this section, not just those involving benefits decisions as interpreted by the majority. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's view on First Amendment claims being exempt from this prohibition; instead asserting that such constitutional issues should be addressed through political processes rather than judicial intervention. In his view, it was inappropriate for courts to interfere in matters related to military affairs and veteran benefits which are better left within Congressional purview.