Johnston v. Laflin was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a contract between two parties was valid. The case involved a contract between Johnston and Laflin, in which Johnston agreed to purchase a tract of land from Laflin. Johnston paid Laflin a portion of the purchase price, but Laflin refused to convey the land to Johnston. Johnston then brought suit against Laflin, claiming that the contract was valid and that Laflin was obligated to convey the land to him. The Supreme Court held that the contract was valid and that Laflin was obligated to convey the land to Johnston. The Court reasoned that the contract was supported by consideration, as Johnston had paid a portion of the purchase price. The Court also noted that the contract was not void for lack of consideration, as Laflin had received something of value in exchange for the land. The Court also held that Laflin was not entitled to any damages for breach of contract, as Johnston had not breached the contract. The Court reasoned that Laflin had refused to convey the land to Johnston, and thus had breached the contract. The Court concluded that Laflin was not entitled to any damages, as Johnston had not breached the contract. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the contract between Johnston and Laflin was valid and that Laflin was obligated to convey the land to Johnston. The Court also held that Laflin was not entitled to any damages for breach of contract, as Johnston had not breached the contract.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Johnston v. Laflin, a case involving an action of ejectment brought by William H. Johnston against John W. Laflin for land located in Wisconsin Territory that was originally granted to one Thomas S. Wilson under the Act of Congress passed on April 20th, 1820 and subsequently conveyed to various parties until it eventually came into possession of Mr. Johnston through purchase from Wilson's heirs at law and legal representatives in 1871-1872. Justice Field argued that although there were some discrepancies between the original patent issued by President Monroe and subsequent conveyances made by Wilson’s heirs, they did not affect title or ownership rights as all documents indicated clear intent to transfer property from one party to another without any reservations or conditions attached thereto; thus making them valid instruments with full force and effect according to applicable laws governing real estate transactions within Wisconsin Territory at the time when such transfers occurred (i.e., prior to its admission into Union). Furthermore, he noted that even if there had been some irregularities present during these transfers – which he believed was not true – then those should have been addressed before trial commenced rather than after judgment had already been rendered since this would be unfair towards defendant who could no longer challenge validity of said instruments due lack standing post-judgmental proceedings (i.e., res judicata doctrine).