The U.S. Supreme Court case Jones v. Interstate Commerce Commission in 1917 revolved around the issue of whether or not the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had overstepped its authority by ordering a railroad company to cease discriminatory practices against black passengers. The plaintiff, J.H. Jones, was an African American man who alleged that he was forced to ride in inferior accommodations despite paying for first-class fare on Southern Railway Company's trains operating between Washington D.C., and Spartanburg, South Carolina. Jones filed a complaint with the ICC which ruled in his favor and ordered Southern Railway Company to stop such discriminatory practices. However, this decision was challenged by the railway company arguing that ICC lacked jurisdiction as it did not have power under federal law to regulate intrastate commerce. The Supreme Court upheld ICC’s order stating that while generally interstate commerce regulation does not extend into areas of purely local activity; however when racial discrimination affects interstate travel it becomes subject matter for federal intervention under Congress’ powers granted by Constitution's Commerce Clause.

In the dissenting opinion for Jones v. Interstate Commerce Commission, it was argued that the Supreme Court should not have jurisdiction over this case as it pertains to a matter of administrative law and regulation - specifically, railway rates set by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The dissenting justices believed that Congress had granted authority to the ICC to regulate these matters and therefore they should be left within its purview. They contended that judicial intervention in such cases undermines regulatory agencies' ability to function effectively and independently. Furthermore, they disagreed with majority's interpretation of "just" and "reasonable" rates under the Hepburn Act; arguing instead for a broader understanding which would allow more flexibility for regulators in setting fair prices. Ultimately, their view was one advocating deference towards administrative bodies like ICC when dealing with complex economic regulations where courts lack expertise.