In the 1999 case of Dewey J. Jones v. United States, Jones challenged his conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime on several grounds. He argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, that the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal based on entrapment as a matter of law, and that he received ineffective assistance from counsel at trial due to their failure to request an instruction regarding multiple conspiracies. The Supreme Court rejected all these arguments. The court found ample evidence supporting both convictions; it also held that Jones had not met the high burden required to establish entrapment as a matter of law since there was sufficient proof showing predisposition towards committing such crimes prior any government involvement. Regarding claims about ineffective legal representation, the court ruled this issue could not be addressed because it wasn't raised properly in lower courts first - hence they lacked jurisdiction over this particular claim.

In the dissenting opinion for Dewey J. Jones v. United States, it was argued that the majority's decision to uphold Jones' conviction under 18 U.S.C §924(c) was incorrect as it misinterpreted Congressional intent and expanded federal jurisdiction over local crimes inappropriately. The dissenters believed that Congress intended §924(c) to apply only when a firearm is used or carried during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime which itself is prosecutable in federal court. They contended that the majority’s interpretation would mean any felonious act involving a gun could potentially be prosecuted federally, even if there were no other connections with interstate commerce - an expansion they saw as unwarranted by legislative history or precedent. Furthermore, they expressed concerns about potential encroachments on state sovereignty due to this broadened scope of federal criminal law enforcement.