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The U.S. Supreme Court case Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., et al. v. Hostetter, Chairman, New York State Liquor Authority, et al., 1965 revolved around the constitutionality of a New York law that regulated the minimum prices for liquor sales in the state and required out-of-state shippers to affirm they would comply with these regulations before being granted permission to sell within its borders. The plaintiffs argued this was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce and violated their rights under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. However, in a decision delivered by Justice Potter Stewart, it was held that states have broad power under the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate alcohol within their borders without violating other constitutional provisions like those found in Article I's Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, despite acknowledging some impact on interstate commerce due to price affirmation requirements imposed by NY law upon out-of-state shippers (like Seagram), such effects were deemed incidental rather than discriminatory against interstate trade; hence not unconstitutional.
In the dissenting opinion for Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., et al. v. Hostetter, Chairman, New York State Liquor Authority, et al., Justice Harlan argued that the majority's decision to uphold a New York law regulating liquor prices was incorrect because it interfered with interstate commerce and violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. He contended that this state regulation had an extraterritorial effect as it controlled transactions occurring wholly outside of its borders - specifically in Maryland where Seagram set its prices - thus violating principles of federalism and state sovereignty by imposing one state's policy on another without consent or reciprocity. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority’s view that Congress' silence on this matter indicated approval; instead asserting that such silence should not be interpreted as implicit permission for states to regulate interstate commerce in ways otherwise prohibited by constitutional doctrine.