Term: 2019
Docket: 18-1323
June Medical Services Llc v. Russo
- Pro
18-1323 JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES V. RUSSO, INTERIM SEC., LA DEPT. OF HEALTH DECISION BELOW: 905 F.3d 787 CONSOLIDATED WITH 18-1460 AND A TOTAL OF ONE HOUR IS ALLOTTED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT CERT. GRANTED 10/4/2019 QUESTION PRESENTED: In Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), this Court held that a state law requiring physicians who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at a local hospital was unconstitutional because it imposed an undue burden on women seeking abortions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld an admitting privileges law in Louisiana that is identical to the one this Court struck down. This presents the following issue: Whether the Fifth Circuit's decision upholding Louisiana's law requiring physicians who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at a local hospital conflicts with this Court's binding precedent in Whole Woman's Health. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 17-30397
In the case of June Medical Services LLC v. Russo, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in a 5-4 decision that Louisiana's law requiring doctors who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals was unconstitutional. The court found that this law placed an undue burden on women seeking an abortion and violated their constitutional rights as established by previous cases such as Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. This ruling reaffirmed the precedent set by Whole Woman’s Health v Hellerstedt (2016), where similar Texas regulations were struck down for imposing burdensome medical requirements on abortion providers without any significant health benefits to patients.
In the dissenting opinion for June Medical Services LLC v. Russo, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the Supreme Court's precedent on abortion is fundamentally flawed and should be reconsidered. He contended that the Louisiana law requiring doctors who perform abortions to have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital was constitutional and did not impose an undue burden on women seeking abortions. He criticized the majority for applying a standard of review that he believed was too lenient towards abortion rights, arguing instead for a stricter interpretation of what constitutes an "undue burden." Furthermore, he questioned whether clinics and physicians should even have legal standing to challenge health and safety regulations on behalf of their patients without showing any concrete harm to themselves. Overall, his dissent emphasized his belief in states' rights to regulate medical procedures within their borders as they see fit.
