This case was a dispute between the Kansas City, Lawrence, and South Kansas Railroad Company and the Attorney General of Kansas. The railroad company argued that the Attorney General had no authority to bring a suit against them for failing to pay taxes. The Attorney General argued that the railroad company was liable for the taxes and that he had the authority to bring the suit. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Attorney General, finding that the railroad company was liable for the taxes and that the Attorney General had the authority to bring the suit. The Court held that the Attorney General had the authority to bring the suit because the railroad company was a corporation created by the state of Kansas and was subject to the laws of the state. The Court also held that the railroad company was liable for the taxes because it had failed to pay them as required by law. The Court's decision established that the Attorney General had the authority to bring suit against corporations created by the state and that those corporations were liable for taxes that they had failed to pay. This decision has been cited in numerous cases since then and has been used to establish the authority of the Attorney General to bring suit against corporations.

In the case of Kansas City, Lawrence, and South Kansas Railroad Company v. The Attorney General, the Supreme Court was tasked with deciding whether a state could tax railroad companies on their property within its borders. The majority opinion held that states had this power to tax railroads as they saw fit; however, Justice Field dissented from this decision. He argued that such taxation would be unconstitutional because it violated the Contract Clause of Article I in the Constitution which prohibits states from passing laws impairing contracts between private parties without just compensation for any losses incurred by those parties. Furthermore, he argued that since these taxes were imposed after many of these railroads had already been built and operating under existing contracts with other entities or individuals - including some made before certain states even existed - then imposing them retroactively constituted an impairment of contract rights without due process or just compensation being provided to those affected by it.