In the case of William Arthur Kelly v. South Carolina, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Kelly by a vote of five to four. The court held that the trial judge had erred in refusing to instruct jurors they could consider a life sentence without parole for Kelly's crimes instead of death penalty because he wouldn't be eligible for parole if sentenced to life imprisonment. This decision was based on Simmons v. South Carolina (1994), where it was established that when future dangerousness is an issue in a capital sentencing proceeding, due process requires informing the jury about defendant’s parole eligibility or lack thereof if given a life sentence. Kelly had been convicted and sentenced to death for murder and other charges related with robbery but his lawyers argued that jurors might have chosen differently if they knew he would never get out on parole under state law at that time which mandates lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole upon conviction for certain offenses. The majority opinion stated: "A jury hearing evidence of a defendant's demonstrated propensity for violence reasonably will conclude that he presents a risk of violent behavior, whether locked up or free, and whether free as a result from paroled release or otherwise." Therefore denying him this right violated his due process rights.

In the dissenting opinion for William Arthur Kelly v. South Carolina, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and Kennedy, argued that the majority's decision was not based on established law but rather on their own personal beliefs about what constitutes a fair trial. They contended that there was no legal precedent to support the notion that a defendant has a constitutional right to inform jurors of his parole ineligibility during sentencing proceedings. The dissenters also criticized the majority for misinterpreting prior cases involving capital punishment and future dangerousness. Furthermore, they disagreed with the assertion that prosecutors had misled jurors about Kelly's potential release if he were not sentenced to death; instead arguing it is reasonable for prosecutors to suggest possible outcomes without explicitly stating them as facts.