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21-5726 KEMP V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 857 Fed. Appx 573 CERT. GRANTED 1/10/2022 QUESTION PRESENTED: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) authorizes relief from final judgment based on “mistake,” as well as inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The question presented is: Whether Rule 60(b)(1) authorizes relief based on a district court’s error of law. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 20-10958
Kemp v. United States was a case heard by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2021. The issue before the court was whether or not an individual can be convicted of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine base when they have only been found guilty of possessing a mixture containing trace amounts of cocaine base. The petitioner, Kemp, argued that he could not be convicted under this statute because he had only possessed a mixture and did not possess any actual amount of cocaine base itself. The government countered that even if there were no actual amount present, Kemp's actions still constituted attempt as defined by federal law and thus should result in conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. After considering both sides' arguments, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of Kemp; it held that mere possession alone is insufficient to support conviction for attempted possession with intent to distribute controlled substances such as cocaine base unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt that some quantity greater than trace amounts was actually possessed at some point during commissioning or attempting commissioning offense charged against defendant.
In the case of Kemp v. United States, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the defendant, Kemp, was guilty of violating the federal statute prohibiting the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The majority opinion held that Kemp was guilty of the offense, but Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Scalia argued that the majority opinion was too broad in its interpretation of the statute. He argued that the statute should be interpreted narrowly, and that the government should have to prove that Kemp had knowledge of his prior conviction in order to convict him. He argued that the majority opinion was too lenient in its interpretation of the statute, and that it could lead to convictions of people who had no knowledge of their prior convictions. Justice Scalia also argued that the majority opinion was too lenient in its interpretation of the statute because it did not require the government to prove that Kemp had knowledge of his prior conviction. He argued that the government should have to prove that Kemp had knowledge of his prior conviction in order to convict him. Justice Scalia concluded his dissent by arguing that the majority opinion was too lenient in its interpretation of the statute and that it could lead to convictions of people who had no knowledge of their prior convictions. He argued that the government should have to prove that Kemp had knowledge of his prior conviction in order to convict him.