Kendig v. Dean was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, John Kendig, was held in a federal prison in Pennsylvania. He sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of the Constitution. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a person's detention, and that the state court had no authority to determine the legality of a federal prisoner's detention. The Court's decision in Kendig v. Dean established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners held in federal prisons. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases, and it remains an important precedent in the area of federal-state relations.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Kendig v. Dean, arguing that the majority had misapplied existing law and failed to consider relevant facts of the case. He argued that under established principles of equity, a court could not grant relief from an illegal contract if it would be inequitable to do so. In this case, he noted that there was no evidence presented by either party as to whether or not granting relief would be equitable; thus, he believed it was improper for the Court to make such a determination without further information on which they could base their decision. Furthermore, Justice Field argued that even if one assumed granting relief were equitable in this instance - something which he did not believe - then still there should have been some consideration given as to how much compensation should be awarded before any judgment was made on behalf of either party. He concluded his dissent by noting his disagreement with both parts of the majority's ruling and expressing his belief that more evidence needed to be considered before any final decision could properly be reached in this matter.