In the case of Keokuk and Hamilton Bridge Company v. Illinois, 1899, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in favor of the bridge company against a claim by Illinois that it had jurisdiction over part of the Mississippi River. The state argued that its boundary extended to include all islands within its original territory and thus included parts of riverbeds on which bridges were built. However, citing previous cases such as Handly's Lessee v. Anthony (1820) and Rhode Island v. Massachusetts (1838), Justice Peckham stated that boundaries established at time of admission into Union could not be altered without consent from Congress or affected states themselves. The court held that even if an island was formed on Iowa side after Illinois' admission into Union, it would belong to Iowa unless there was evidence showing otherwise - something which wasn't provided in this case by Illinois who bore burden proof for their claims about jurisdictional changes due to accretion or avulsion processes affecting river course over time. Therefore, since no alterations were made with necessary consents nor sufficient proofs presented regarding natural geographical changes shifting borders; consequently any structures like bridges built upon these areas fell under jurisdictions where they physically stood rather than being subject to regulations imposed by neighboring states based on historical territorial claims.

In the dissenting opinion for Keokuk and Hamilton Bridge Company v. Illinois, Justice Harlan argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with previous rulings of the Court regarding interstate commerce. He contended that a state cannot impose a tax on property used exclusively in interstate commerce without violating the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. According to him, this principle should apply regardless of whether or not Congress has legislated on such matters because it is derived directly from constitutional law itself rather than federal statutes. Furthermore, he disagreed with how much weight was given to evidence showing that tolls were charged for crossing bridges; he believed these charges did not constitute taxation but were instead compensation for services rendered by bridge companies. Therefore, they should be considered separately from taxes levied by states against properties involved in interstate trade.