The U.S. Supreme Court case Kercheval v. United States in 1926 revolved around the issue of a withdrawn guilty plea being used as evidence in a subsequent trial. The defendant, Kercheval, had initially pleaded guilty to an indictment but later withdrew his plea and proceeded to trial where he was found guilty based on his initial admission of guilt among other evidences presented by the prosecution. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that once a court allows withdrawal of a guilty plea it is removed from the record and cannot be used as evidence against the accused at their trial for that crime because this would violate due process rights under Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination. The court held that when such pleas are withdrawn they should be treated as though they never existed hence any reference or use during trials constitutes error.

In the dissenting opinion for Kercheval v. United States, Justice Stone argued that a defendant's withdrawn guilty plea should not be used as evidence against them in subsequent trials. He believed that this practice violated the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination and was contrary to common law principles of fairness and justice. Furthermore, he contended that allowing such pleas to be used as evidence could discourage defendants from pleading guilty out of fear their plea could later be used against them if they decided to withdraw it. This would undermine the efficiency of court proceedings by discouraging early resolution through guilty pleas.