In the case of King v. Mullins in 1897, the United States Supreme Court addressed a dispute over land ownership and mineral rights in West Virginia. The plaintiff, Mr. King, claimed that he had purchased property from Mr. Mullins with an agreement that included all coal and iron ore within it; however, after discovering valuable minerals on his new property, Mr. Mullins attempted to reclaim these resources by arguing they were not part of their original deal due to a technicality in state law regarding deeds transfer. The court ruled against this argument stating that while West Virginia law did require specific language for transferring mineral rights separately from surface rights - such as "coal" or "iron ore" being explicitly mentioned - this requirement was only applicable when selling off those particular assets independently rather than including them within a larger transaction involving entire properties like what happened between King and Mullins. Therefore since no evidence suggested any intention by either party to exclude these materials during their negotiations nor any separate compensation given specifically for them afterwards (which would have indicated an understanding they weren't initially covered), the justices concluded all underground substances naturally belonging there should be considered part of what was sold unless otherwise specified – thus affirming lower courts' decisions favoring King's claim over everything beneath his ground too.

In the dissenting opinion for King v. Mullins, it was argued that the majority had erred in their interpretation of West Virginia law and its application to this case. The dissenting justices believed that under state law, a sheriff could not be held liable for failing to collect taxes from insolvent taxpayers. They contended that the responsibility fell upon county officials who were tasked with assessing property values and determining tax liability. Furthermore, they disagreed with the majority's view on how insolvency should be defined legally; arguing instead for a more lenient definition which would protect sheriffs from being unfairly penalized when unable to collect due taxes from truly insolvent individuals or entities. In essence, these justices felt strongly that local laws should dictate proceedings in such cases rather than federal interpretations thereof.