In the case of Carl Kircher, et al. v. Putnam Funds Trust et al., 2005, a group of mutual fund investors filed suit against Putnam Investment Management and its trustees for alleged breach of fiduciary duty under Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act (ICA). The plaintiffs claimed that they were charged excessive fees by the defendants which violated their fiduciary duties as investment advisers. However, both district court and appeals court dismissed these claims on grounds that they lacked merit since there was no evidence to suggest any abuse or violation in setting up fee structures. The Supreme Court upheld this decision stating that while ICA does impose a fiduciary duty on investment advisors regarding compensation for services, it doesn't necessarily mean every disagreement over advisor's fees would constitute a breach of this duty. It clarified that only those cases where an adviser charges a fee so disproportionately large compared to services rendered could be considered as breaching their duties under section 36(b). Therefore, unless such proof is provided by plaintiffs showing gross discrepancy between fees charged and services offered leading to substantial harm to shareholders' interests, mere allegations about high advisory fees wouldn't suffice.

In the dissenting opinion for Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) did not strip state courts of jurisdiction over cases removed from federal court. He contended that SLUSA only prevented plaintiffs from filing certain securities class actions in state court but did not prevent defendants from removing such cases to federal court and then having them remanded back to state court if they were found not precluded by SLUSA. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's interpretation of "except as provided" in §77p(c), arguing it should be read as referring to all exceptions within §77p rather than just those within subsection (b). Thus, according to him, a case could be removed under general removal statutes and then sent back if it was determined not precluded by SLUSA. He also criticized the majority's reliance on legislative history instead of statutory text.