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18-15 KISOR V. WILKIE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS DECISION BELOW: 869 F.3d 1360 GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. CERT. GRANTED 12/10/2018 QUESTION PRESENTED: Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and Bowles Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), direct courts to defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation. Separately, in Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994), the Court held that "interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran's favor.” Petitioner, a Marine veteran, seeks disability benefits for his service-related post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). While the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) agrees that petitioner suffers from service-related PTSD, it has refused to award him retroactive benefits. The VA's decision turns on the meaning of the term "relevant" as used in 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(l). Below, the Federal Circuit found that petitioner and the VA both offered reasonable constructions of that term. On that basis alone, the court held that the regulation is ambiguous, and-invoking Auer- deferred to the VA's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the Court should overrule Auer and Seminole Rock. 2. Alternatively, whether Auer deference should yield to a substantive canon of construction. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 16-1929
The case of Kisor v. Wilkie, 2018 revolved around the interpretation of a regulation by an administrative agency. James Kisor, a Vietnam War veteran, sought disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for post-traumatic stress disorder. His claim was initially denied in 1983 but reopened in 2006 after he presented relevant combat records that were not included in his first application. The VA granted him benefits but refused to apply them retroactively to his initial claim date as per their interpretation of "relevant" under its regulations. Kisor appealed this decision up to the Supreme Court arguing against Auer deference - a principle where courts defer to agencies' reasonable interpretations of their own ambiguous rules unless they are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with regulation. In June 2019, the Supreme Court upheld Auer deference by ruling on a narrow ground and remanded it back for reconsideration under proper standards; however, it also clarified and narrowed when such deference should be applied.
In the dissenting opinion for Kisor v. Wilkie, Justice Gorsuch argued that the court should have overturned Auer deference, a doctrine which instructs courts to defer to an agency's interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations unless it is clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. He contended that this principle violates due process and separation of powers by allowing agencies both to write laws and interpret them. Furthermore, he criticized Auer as being unpredictable in application and fostering unfair surprise for regulated parties who cannot anticipate how their conduct might be judged under these interpretations. Lastly, he expressed concern about potential abuse of power by administrative agencies through arbitrary decision-making or self-delegation of legislative authority without proper checks and balances.