In the case of Knox County v. Harshman, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a county could be held liable for damages caused by a county employee’s negligence. The case arose when a Knox County employee, Harshman, negligently operated a county-owned vehicle, resulting in an accident that caused injury to a third party. The third party sued the county for damages, arguing that the county was liable for Harshman’s negligence. The Supreme Court held that the county could not be held liable for Harshman’s negligence. The Court reasoned that the county was not liable because it had not authorized or ratified Harshman’s negligent conduct. The Court further reasoned that the county had not assumed any responsibility for Harshman’s negligence by providing him with a vehicle or by failing to adequately train him. The Court’s decision in Knox County v. Harshman established that a county cannot be held liable for the negligence of its employees unless the county has authorized or ratified the employee’s conduct. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases involving governmental liability for the negligence of its employees.

In the case of Knox County v. Harshman, Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority had failed to properly interpret Tennessee law and should have found for the defendant. He noted that under Tennessee law, when an individual is appointed to a position with tenure protection, they are entitled to continued employment until removed by due process or retirement. The county had attempted to argue that because Harshman was not reappointed after his term expired, he no longer held tenure status and could be terminated without cause or due process; however, Justice Scalia disagreed with this interpretation of state law and argued it would lead to absurd results if applied broadly across all public employees in Tennessee. He concluded by stating that while there may be circumstances where an employee can lose their job upon expiration of their term without any form of due process being required (such as at-will employees), those circumstances were not present here since Harshman's appointment carried with it certain protections from termination absent good cause or proper procedure being followed first.