| No search history |
Your feedback is extremely important to us and greatly appreciated.
Tell us what went wrong

03-407 KOWALSKI v. TESMER Ruling below: CA 6, 333 F.3d 683 QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Michigan Constitution, Mich Const 1963, art I, §20, provides that a criminal defendant who pleads guilty shall not have an appeal of right and shall have a right to appointed appellate counsel ''as provided by law ." A Michigan statute, Michigan Compiled Law (MCL) 770.3a, provides, with significant listed exceptions, that criminal defendants who plead guilty shall not have appointed appellate counsel for discretionary appeals for review of the defendant's conviction or sentence. I. Does the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee a right to an appointed appellate attorney in a discretionary first appeal of an indigent criminal defendant convicted by a guilty plea? II. Do attorneys have third-party standing on behalf of potential future indigent criminal defendants to make a constitutional challenge to a state statute prohibiting appointment of appellate counsel in discretionary first appeals following convictions by guilty pleas where the federal courts properly abstained from hearing the claims of indigent criminal defendants themselves? CERT. GRANTED: 1/20/04
The U.S. Supreme Court case Kowalski v. Tesmer, 2004, revolved around a Michigan law that limited the right to appellate counsel for indigent defendants who pleaded guilty or no contest in their initial trial court proceedings. The respondents, two attorneys and one potential defendant (Tesmer), challenged this statute as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. However, the Supreme Court ruled against them on procedural grounds without addressing these substantive constitutional claims. The majority opinion held that neither the attorneys nor the potential defendant had standing to sue because they could not demonstrate an actual injury traceable to enforcement of this statute: The lawyers' future income loss was too speculative since it depended on decisions by third parties (indigent defendants) while Tesmer himself hadn't yet been denied appellate counsel under this law so his claim was premature. This decision effectively upheld Michigan's restriction on providing state-funded appellate lawyers for indigent defendants who plead guilty or no contest but left open whether such restrictions might be constitutionally invalid if properly challenged by someone with standing.
In the dissenting opinion for Kowalski v. Tesmer, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the majority's decision was based on a misinterpretation of precedent and an overly narrow view of standing doctrine. He contended that both attorneys and their potential clients should have been granted standing to challenge Michigan’s law barring appointed appellate counsel for indigent defendants who plead guilty or no contest in court proceedings. According to him, this restriction violated these individuals' constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel during critical stages of criminal prosecutions. Furthermore, he emphasized that denying lawyers the ability to advocate for future clients' rights undermines not only those individuals’ interests but also public interest in ensuring fair legal representation within justice system.