In the 1933 case Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Dimon Steamship Corp., the U.S Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a shipper could recover damages for cargo that had been damaged during transport, despite having signed a bill of lading which absolved the carrier from liability for such damage. The court ruled in favor of Krauss Bros., stating that although they had signed a bill of lading, it did not exempt Dimon Steamship Corp from their duty as common carriers to safely deliver goods entrusted to them by shippers. The court held that clauses within bills of lading which attempt to limit or remove this responsibility are invalid and unenforceable under federal law.

The dissenting opinion in the case of Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Dimon Steamship Corp., argued that the majority's decision to hold the steamship company liable for damages was incorrect, as it failed to consider key aspects of maritime law and contract interpretation. The dissent pointed out that under maritime law, a ship owner is not responsible for damage caused by an inherent defect in cargo unless they had knowledge of such defect prior to loading; this principle should have been applied here since there was no evidence suggesting that Dimon Steamship Corp knew about any defects in lumber before loading them onto their vessel. Furthermore, according to standard principles of contract interpretation, ambiguous terms should be construed against party who drafted it - which would be Krauss Bros., not Dimon Steamship Corp., thus further supporting their argument against liability.