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08-911 KUCANA V. HOLDER DECISION BELOW: 533 F.3d 534 ORDER OF JULY 30, 2009 AMANDA C. LEITER, ESQ., OF WASHINGTON, D.C., IS INVITED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THIS CASE AS AMICUS CURIAE, IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW. CERT. GRANTED 4/27/2009 QUESTION PRESENTED: 1. What is the scope of the jurisdictional stripping provision of 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and whether the statute removes jurisdiction from federal courts to review rulings on motions to reopen by the Board of Immigration Appeals? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 07-1002
In the case of Agron Kucana v. Eric H. Holder Jr., Attorney General, 2009, the U.S Supreme Court ruled that federal courts have jurisdiction to review decisions made by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) regarding motions to reopen removal proceedings against non-citizens. The court held that a provision in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which bars judicial review of discretionary decisions made by the attorney general related to immigration cases, does not apply to motions for reopening such cases because they are procedural rather than substantive matters. This decision overturned a previous ruling by Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and clarified that Congress did not intend for this bar on judicial review to extend so broadly as it had been interpreted previously.
In the dissenting opinion for Agron Kucana v. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, Justice Alito argued that the majority misinterpreted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). He contended that Congress intended to strip federal courts of jurisdiction over discretionary decisions made by immigration officials, including motions to reopen removal proceedings like Kucana's case. According to him, this interpretation aligns with IIRIRA’s purpose of streamlining deportation procedures and reducing judicial intervention in immigration matters. Furthermore, he disagreed with the majority's reliance on a rule presuming congressional intent to preserve judicial review unless clearly stated otherwise; instead arguing for an approach based on statutory text rather than assumptions about legislative intent.