| No search history |
Your feedback is extremely important to us and greatly appreciated.
Tell us what went wrong

10-879 KURNS V. RAILROAD FRICTION PRODUCTS CORP. DECISION BELOW: 620 F.3d 392 CERT. GRANTED 6/6/2011 QUESTION PRESENTED: DID CONGRESS INTEND THE FEDERAL RAILROAD SAFETY ACTS TO PREEMPT STATE LAW-BASED TORT LAWSUITS? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 09-1634
In the case of Gloria Gail Kurns, executrix of the estate of George M. Corson, deceased, et al., v. Railroad Friction Products Corporation et al., 2011, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in favor of Railroad Friction Products Corporation and Viad Corp by a vote of 6-3. The court held that state-law design-defect and failure-to-warn claims were preempted by federal law under the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA). George Corson had worked for a railroad company where he was exposed to asbestos from products made by these companies leading to his mesothelioma diagnosis. His wife filed suit alleging that her husband's disease resulted from defective design and inadequate warnings about potential health hazards associated with their products. However, because railroads are federally regulated industries under LIA which requires locomotives be safe to operate without unnecessary danger to life or limb; any state laws imposing liability would conflict with this regulation hence they were preempted.
In the dissenting opinion for Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corporation, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, argued that state-law design-defect claims should not be preempted by federal law. They contended that the majority's interpretation of the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA) was overly broad and inconsistent with Congress' intent when it enacted the statute. The dissenting justices believed that while Congress intended to regulate locomotive equipment safety through federal standards, it did not intend to prevent states from providing additional remedies for injuries caused by defective products used on locomotives. Therefore, they disagreed with the majority's conclusion that all state-law claims related to locomotive equipment are preempted under LIA.