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Lamar v. Micou is a United States Supreme Court case that was decided in 1881. The case involved a dispute between two parties over a contract for the sale of a cotton plantation. The plaintiff, Lamar, had entered into a contract with the defendant, Micou, to purchase the plantation for $20,000. The contract stated that the purchase price was to be paid in two installments, with the first installment due at the time of the contract's execution. Lamar paid the first installment, but Micou refused to transfer the title of the plantation to Lamar until the second installment was paid. Lamar then brought suit against Micou, claiming that he was entitled to the title of the plantation because he had fulfilled his obligations under the contract. The Supreme Court held that Lamar was entitled to the title of the plantation. The Court reasoned that the contract was a valid and binding agreement, and that Lamar had fulfilled his obligations under the contract by paying the first installment. The Court also held that Micou had no right to withhold the title of the plantation until the second installment was paid, as this was not a condition of the contract. Therefore, the Court held that Lamar was entitled to the title of the plantation, and that Micou was liable for damages for his breach of the contract.
Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Lamar v. Micou, arguing that the majority had failed to consider a key issue: whether or not there was an implied warranty of title when the property was sold by Micou to Lamar. He argued that under Georgia law, such a warranty existed and should have been considered by the court. Field further noted that even if no express warranty of title had been made at time of sale, it did not necessarily mean that one could be excluded from consideration altogether; instead he argued for its inclusion as part of any contract between two parties involving real estate sales. Finally, Justice Field concluded his dissent with an admonishment against allowing courts to ignore established legal principles simply because they are inconvenient or difficult to apply in certain cases.