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In the case of Lane, Corrections Director v. Williams et al., 1981, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether a violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure could be challenged after completion of a sentence. The respondents had pleaded guilty to federal charges and were sentenced under an Illinois statute that mandated certain sentencing enhancements for repeat offenders. They later argued their pleas were invalid because they hadn't been informed about these mandatory enhancements as required by Rule 11. However, by this time they had already completed their sentences. The court held that since the respondents' sentences had expired, there was no longer a live controversy and thus it lacked jurisdiction to hear their claims due to mootness doctrine - which requires an actual ongoing dispute for federal courts to have jurisdiction. It also noted that even if there was error in accepting plea agreements without informing them about mandatory sentencing enhancement provisions, such error did not automatically entitle them to relief since it didn’t necessarily affect substantial rights or result in miscarriage of justice.
In the dissenting opinion for Lane v. Williams, Justice William Brennan Jr., joined by Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry Blackmun, argued that the majority's decision failed to address a key issue: whether or not respondents were denied their constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel due to their attorneys' failure to inform them about mandatory parole terms attached with plea agreements. The dissenters believed that this omission was significant enough to warrant setting aside the guilty pleas. They contended that if defendants had been properly informed about these consequences, they might have chosen differently in accepting plea bargains. Thus, it was wrong for the court majority not only ignore this aspect but also impose an additional requirement on defendants - proving they would've pleaded differently had they known about parole stipulations - which wasn't required in previous cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel claims.