Langford v. Monteith was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, Langford, was held in a federal prison in the state of Georgia. Langford sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a person's detention, and not to challenge the conditions of the detention. The Court's decision in Langford v. Monteith established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners held in federal prisons. The decision also clarified the scope of the writ of habeas corpus, and established that it could only be used to challenge the legality of a person's detention, and not to challenge the conditions of the detention.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Langford v. Monteith, arguing that the majority had misconstrued the language of a deed and failed to consider relevant evidence regarding its interpretation. The deed in question conveyed land from one party to another with an exception for certain rights-of-way; however, it was unclear whether these rights were intended to be exclusive or non-exclusive. Justice Field argued that this ambiguity should have been resolved by considering extrinsic evidence such as parol testimony and surrounding circumstances which could shed light on how parties understood their agreement at the time it was made. He further noted that even if there were no clear indication of intent from such sources, courts should presume a grantor’s intention is for an easement rather than full ownership unless otherwise specified in writing due to public policy considerations favoring free use of roads over private control over them. Ultimately, he concluded that because this case involved a dispute between two individuals about access across each other’s property lines, any doubt as to what type of right they agreed upon must be resolved against granting full title since doing so would deprive both parties of reasonable use and enjoyment of their respective properties without just compensation being paid first.